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What	a	CETA	(or	CETA+)	free	trade	agreement	would
mean
The	UK	seems	to	be	aiming	for	a	CETA	or	CETA+-type	free	trade	agreement	with	the	EU.	Steve
Woolcock	(LSE)	takes	a	detailed	look	at	the	European	Commission’s	negotiating	position	and
explains	some	of	its	implications	for	trade.	Significantly,	the	inclusion	of	‘most	favoured	nation’
clauses	effectively	limits	the	UK’s	scope	to	negotiate	deals	with	other	countries,	and	means	the	EU
is	unlikely	to	give	the	UK	better	access	to	the	Single	Market	in	future.
We	have	now	seen	the	revised	draft	negotiating	position	from	the	European	Commission,	and
heard	the	much-flagged	speech	by	the	Prime	Minister.		The	EU	negotiating	position	is	that	the	UK	will	become	a	third
country	when	it	leaves	the	Union,	and	that	given	the	UK’s	‘red	lines’	the	only	approach	that	is	consistent	with	both	EU
and	UK	preferences	and	interests	is	a	CETA	–	or	perhaps	CETA-type	–	agreement.	This	would	mean	that	the
regulatory	recognition	the	UK	now	enjoys	will	cease.		Goods	and	services	produced	in	the	UK	will	no	longer	be
recognised	as	fulfilling	the	EU	requirements.		Presumably	it	would	then	be	a	question	of	negotiating.
Jaguar-Land	Rover	was	the	biggest	exporter	of	cars	in	Britain	in	2017.	Photo:	Thomas	Hawk	via
a	CC-BY-NC	2.0	licence
In	her	speech	on	March	2,	Theresa	May	in	effect	made	the	case	again	for	a	bespoke	agreement	based	on	a	three-
tiered	approach	to	regulatory	engagement	with	the	EU,	but	outside	the	Single	Market	and	Customs	Union.		In	terms
of	the	terminology	of	trade	agreements,	the	three	tiers	appear	to	be:
equivalence,	meaning	‘regulatory	recognition’,	or	the	EU	accepting	the	regulatory	norms	and	standards	of	the	UK;
mutual	recognition	of	conformity	assessment,	meaning	the	EU	would	recognise	UK	testing	of	goods	including	food
and	food	products	that	show	these	to	be	in	conformity	with	EU	regulatory	requirements;
and	regulatory	autonomy,	meaning	presumably	divergence.
So	how	does	the	CETA,	with	or	without	a	‘plus’,	relate	to	the	current	debate?
Tariffs	and	border	controls
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First,	CETA	–	like	all	FTAs	between	developed	economies	–	offers	nearly	full	tariff	liberalisation,	i.e.	99%	for
manufactured	goods	and	94%	for	agriculture	on	entry	into	force,	reducing	to	zero	between	three	and	seven	years
later.	So	a	CETA+	could	be	seen	as	tariff	free	trade.	CETA	is,	of	course,	an	FTA	not	a	customs	union,	and	the
parties	retain	autonomy	in	trade	policy.		So	there	would	be	trade	costs	associated	with	showing	compliance	with	(EU)
rules	of	origin,	but	these	could	be	reduced	through	producer	certification.	A	CETA	model	would	not	remove	the	trade
costs	associated	with	border	controls.	Nor,	importantly,	would	a	customs	union,	because	the	need	for	border	controls
would	remain	in	order	to	ensure	goods	imported	into	the	EU	(or	the	UK)	complied	with	EU	health,	food	safety
standards	etc.
In	terms	of	border	controls,	CETA	encourages	the	use	of	advanced	electronic	procedures	to	speed	customs
clearance.		These	are	in	line	with	the	WTO’s	Trade	Facilitation	Agreement	and	WCO’s	(World	Customs
Organisation)	protocols.	But	agreeing	to	these	rules	is	not	sufficient:	there	also	has	to	be	a	mutual	commitment	to
adopt	them	rapidly,	and	effectively	apply	them.
Trade	costs	due	to	regulatory	divergence
Under	a	CETA	model,	divergence	in	regulatory	norms	and	practices	would	be	a	far	more	important	medium	to	long-
term	cost	for	business	than	tariffs	or	border	controls.	This	point	seems	to	have	been	accepted	in	the	Prime	Minister’s
speech,	which	argued	the	case	for	the	UK	to	remain	associated	with	a	number	of	EU	regulatory	bodies.		The	Prime
Minister	also	argued	that	all	EU	FTAs	vary,	which	shows	the	EU	can	be	flexible	and	need	not	hold	to	any	particular
model.
The	CETA	approach,	building	on	long-established	voluntary	cooperation	between	the	parties,	provides	the
procedures	for	building	confidence.	Voluntary	cooperation	may	then	lead	to	more	formal	mutual	recognition	of
conformity	assessment,	and	finally	perhaps	equivalence.		This	was	indeed	how	the	EU	brought	about	regulatory
alignment	in	the	Single	Market	and	it	is	the	approach	it	uses	in	FTAs,	although	in	these	mutual	recognition	and
equivalence	is	very	limited.		Compared	with	the	full	regulatory	recognition	of	the	Single	Market,	CETA	–	which	is	the
most	advanced	agreement	the	EU	has	signed	–	is	much	more	limited.
A	Regulatory	Cooperation	Forum	(Chapter	21	of	CETA)	is	established	to	promote	voluntary	joint	cooperation
activities.			This	would	have	no	impact	on	regulatory	autonomy,	so	would	correspond	to	the	third	tier	in	the	UK
proposals.
For	goods	(Chapter	4),	food	and	food	products	(Chapter	5)	and	professional	services	(Chapter	11)	the	CETA	model
offers	a	route	to	negotiate	mutual	recognition.		There	is	a	specific	Protocol	on	the	mutual	acceptance	of	results	of
conformity	assessment.		In	other	words,	this	would	be	roughly	what	the	UK	proposal	has	in	mind	for	the	second	tier.
But	the	CETA	model	provides	only	the	procedural	framework.		Formal	mutual	recognition	agreements	would	need	to
be	negotiated.		There	is	scope	for	the	accreditation	of	conformity	assessment	bodies	(i.e.	UK	bodies	would	be
accredited	to	conduct	tests).		Some	priority	sectors	are	also	identified,	such	as	machinery,	radio	and	telecoms	and
measuring	equipment.
Past	cooperation	has	resulted	in	the	adoption	of	an	agreement	on	Veterinary	Equivalence,	but	there	is	nothing	on
equivalence	of	financial	services	in	the	chapter	about	them	(Chapter	13).
So	on	the	regulatory	question,	the	CETA	model	would	mean	starting	again	from	the	bottom	up	to	negotiate	mutual
recognition	or	regulatory	recognition/equivalence.		The	UK	wishes	to	start	from	the	top,	and	negotiate	a	de-
recognition.		For	trading	companies,	the	absence	of	mutual	recognition	or	equivalence	would	not	mean	they	could
not	trade,	but	that	there	would	be	additional	costs.
Establishment
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Another	way	to	avoid	the	costs	of	doing	business	in	another	market	is	to	supply	the	market	by	means	of	branches	or
affiliates,	in	other	words	through	investment.	The	CETA	model	includes	comprehensive	coverage	of	investment	or
the	right	to	establish	an	operation	in	the	other	market.		Unlike	the	WTO,	which	only	covers	establishment	in	the
service	sector,	there	is	a	separate	chapter	in	the	CETA-type	agreement.	This	is	now	common	in	all	recent	FTAs.
Coverage	of	investment	is	based	on	a	two-schedule	model	that	binds	the	parties	to	liberalisation	in	some	sectors,	but
leaves	them	freedom	to	reintroduce	regulation	or	restrictions	in	others.	This	is	relevant	when	the	state	wishes	to	re-
regulate	certain	sectors.	Thus	social,	health	and	education	services	can	be	excluded,	as	can	the	utilities	in	which
universal	service	provision	is	seen	as	important.
The	CETA	model	also	offers	a	‘modernised’	investment	policy	that	rebalances	investor	protection	and	the	right	to
regulate	in	favour	of	the	latter,	and	introduces	an	investment	court	system,	which	effectively	brings	public	control
back	into	the	area	of	investment	dispute	settlement
One	important	point	to	note	in	the	CETA	is	that	it	includes	a	‘most	favoured	nation’	(MFN)	clause	in	chapter	8	on
investment,	as	well	as	chapter	9	on	cross-border	provision	of	services	and	chapter	13	on	financial	services.	This
means	that	any	offer	the	EU	makes	to	the	UK	that	is	better,	in	terms	of	market	access,	than	what	the	EU	has	granted
to	Canada,	must	automatically	be	extended	to	Canada.	Other	EU	FTAs	also	include	MFN	clauses.		If	the	CETA
model	were	followed,	it	would	also	mean	that	for	the	chapters	covered,	any	better	access	granted	by	the	UK	to	a
third	country	would	also	be	automatically	extended	to	the	EU.	In	other	words	the	inclusion	of	MFN	clauses	in
chapters	of	FTAs	already	negotiated	by	the	EU	reduces	the	willingness	of	the	EU	to	make	concessions	to	the	UK.	An
EU–UK	FTA	based	on	CETA	would	also	effectively	reduce	the	UK’s	autonomy	in	trade	policy,	because	it	would	be
constrained	in	any	preferences	it	could	offer,	for	example	to	the	US	or	Australia	in	an	FTA.
Horizontal	chapters
In	her	speech,	the	Prime	Minister	appeared	to	accept	the	need	for	close	cooperation	between	the	EU	and	UK
authorities	on	topics	such	as	competition	policy	and	public	contracts	in	order	to	ensure	a	level	playing	field.		In	these
fields	CETA	provides	only	weak	measures	for	cooperation	on	restrictive	business	practices	and	relies	essentially	on
(weak)	WTO	disciplines	on	state	subsidies.	On	the	important	topic	of	public	contracts,	CETA	has	provided	the	EU
with	enhanced	access	to	Canadian	markets	in	that	it	has	extended	the	rules	to	the	provincial	level	public
procurement	markets.
Dispute	settlement
On	the	resolution	of	disputes,	the	CETA	model	essentially	uses	the	WTO	model	in	terms	of	the	procedures	–	in	other
words,	it	is	a	quasi	–judicial	approach	based	on	arbitration	in	a	panel	of	experts.	But	there	is	no	supra-national	legal
body	and	there	is	no	direct	effect.
Summing	up
The	CETA	model	therefore	preserves	the	UK’s	red	lines	except	for	no	border	controls,	and	offers	tariff	free	or	near
tariff	free	trade.		It	would	mean	negotiating	access	commitments	from	the	‘bottom	up’	with	the	UK	treated	as	a	third
country	when	it	leaves	the	EU,	rather	than	the	‘top	down’	–	as	is	the	UK’s	preference.
A	CETA+	type	agreement	could	add	key	areas	of	interest	to	both	parties,	probably	based	on	reciprocity.		As	more
people	are	realising,	the	closer	the	UK	is	to	the	EU,	the	more	it	will	be	a	rule	taker.
How	effective	any	CETA+	type	arrangements	will	be	depends	not	on	the	text	of	any	negotiated	agreement,	but	how
effectively	the	parties	adopt	the	appropriate	measures	and	how	effectively	these	are	implemented.		In	other	words
the	text	of	the	agreement	is	likely	to	provide	less	than	full	security	of	market	access.
The	scope	of	FTAs	is	heavily	shaped	by	precedent.		The	EU	will	be	reluctant	to	offer	more	to	the	UK	than	it	does	to
other	third	parties	because	these	will	then	demand	the	same.	The	inclusion	of	MFN	clauses	in	FTAs	also	limits	the
scope	of	any	EU–UK	FTA	and	the	autonomy	of	a	UK	trade	policy.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.
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Steve	Woolcock	is	an	Associate	Professor	of	International	Relations	at	the	LSE.	He	has	served	as	a	consultant	to	the
European	Parliament,	European	Commission,	OECD,	Commonwealth	Secretariat,	the	UK	and	other	governments.		
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